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TRADEMARK LAW-THE EXTRATERRITORIAL ApPLICATION 
OF THE LANHAM ACT: THE FIRST CIRCUIT CUTS THE F AT FROM 
THE VANITY FAIR TEST 
INTRODUCTION 
A. The Hypothetical 
Jimmy Collins is a professional baseball player who dreams of 
major league stardom as he toils away in the minors. The typical 
ten-hour bus trip to road games results in ample spare time, but he 
keeps himself busy by learning how to shape pieces of leather into 
baseball gloves. Eventually, his glove-making skills become so 
good that he starts using his custom gloves for games and practice. 
A struggling teammate looking for an edge asks Jimmy to custom­
make him a glove, and Jimmy happily obliges. From this small be­
ginning, word quickly spreads around the league that Jimmy Collins 
can make anyone a custom glove for a small fee. 
Although Jimmy still has hopes of playing in the major leagues, 
his side business provides him with a steady stream of income. To 
help generate new business, Jimmy proudly places his own logo­
an interlocked J and C set within a diamond-on all his custom 
gloves. Jimmy tells his agent about his glove business and the agent 
helps him to register the trademark. Before long, at least one 
player on every team in the league is using a Jimmy Collins Custom 
Glove. 
After five years of long bus trips, small towns, and fast food, a 
torn rotator cuff ends Jimmy's playing career. He turns his focus 
full-time to his glove-making venture and invests a substantial sum 
of money into his growing brand. Business takes off and his gloves 
are soon being used by many players throughout the minor and ma­
jor leagues. 
Looking to expand his business, Jimmy travels to the baseball 
hotbed of the Dominican Republic to promote his product. He is 
outraged when he discovers imitation Jimmy Collins Custom 
Gloves scattered around Dominican ballparks. Jimmy has never 
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sold a glove in the Dominican nor advertised his product there. He 
finds out from some young ballplayers that Major League Baseball 
games are broadcast in the Dominican and their favorite Domini­
can superstar wears a Jimmy Collins Custom Glove. They tell 
Jimmy of a salesman who comes around in a van selling what alleg­
edly are Jimmy Collins Custom Gloves like the ones players wear 
on television. Jimmy informs the youths their gloves are actually 
poor-quality imitations and not authentic Jimmy Collins Custom 
Gloves. 
Jimmy believes the sale of poor-quality imitation gloves will 
have a substantial negative impact on his business. In the short 
term, it will be difficult for Jimmy to expand his business into the 
Dominican with the imitation gloves on the market. In the long 
term, the consumers who purchased the imitation gloves will for­
ever associate the Jimmy Collins trademark with an inferior prod­
uct. Consequently, even if Jimmy is able to expand successfully 
into the Dominican, he has probably forever lost these potential 
customers. 
When Jimmy gets back to the United States, he consults an 
intellectual-property attorney. The attorney suggests a suit for 
trademark infringement under the Lanham Act. However, since 
the infringement was done in a foreign country, a federal court will 
have to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction to hear the claim. More­
over, the attorney tells Jimmy that even though the trademark in­
fringement has arguably had a substantial effect on U.S. commerce, 
federal courts probably have no jurisdiction over a claim of trade­
mark infringement. Since the majority of jurisdictions do not per­
mit claims when the infringer is a foreign citizen and the 
infringement occurred in a foreign country, Jimmy is probably out 
of luck. 
B. Trademarks and the Law 
As the hypothetical suggests, trademarks play a valuable role 
for consumers and producers alike. For consumers, trademarks are 
a shorthand way to distinguish products.1 For producers, trade­
marks accumulate goodwill.2 They surround us in all forms of ad­
1. See Thomas D. Drescher, The Transformation and Evolution of Trademarks­
From Signals to Symbols to Myth, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 301, 322-23 (1992); see infra 
note 52 and accompanying text. 
2. The goodwill associated with a trademark often becomes the centerpiece of a 
business. 1 1. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 86 
(Lawyers Co-Operative 1973) (describing four primary functions trademarks serve). 
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vertising, help us find what we are looking for at the grocery store, 
and sometimes even transcend their usual economic role and be­
come a part of our common culture.3 
The U.S. economy has undergone two major evolutions that 
have had a profound impact on U.S. trademark law.4 First, the 
many diverse regional economies that characterized this country 
before the Industrial Revolution have merged into a single, unified, 
national economy.s In response to this first evolution, the Lanham 
Act6 was enacted to offer uniform trademark protection to national 
brands.7 
The second evolution is ongoing. Our national economy is rap­
idly changing into an international economy where, in many re­
spects, products and information move as freely from country to 
country as they do from state to state.8 U.S. courts are now contin­
ually faced with the task of protecting U.S. trademarks when they 
are infringed upon in a global economy. However, courts are hesi­
tant to expand the reach of U.S. law to cover the seemingly limitless 
wrongs that are effectuated around the globe.9 
An example of this phenomenon is the Coca-Cola Company and its COKE brand. The 
company hardly ever touts the taste of its COKE products, yet finds 60 percent of its 
company value in this brand. Megan Richardson, Trade Marks and Language, 26 SYD­
NEY L. REV. 193, 194 & n.9 (2004) (citing Interbrand, World's Most Famous Brands 
Ranked by Interbrand 2001). Typically, companies that sell "consumer experience" 
goods like soft drinks find the trademark to be one of their most valuable assets. See 
Jerre B. Swann, Sr., Dilution Redefined for the Year 2002, 92 TRADEMARK REP. 585, 595 
n.79 (2002) (defining consumer experience goods as "relatively inexpensive, frequently 
purchased products that a consumer typically will select by trial and error"). 
3. A single trademark may be used on a wide range of products, thus embedding 
the trademark's "symbolic importance" into the bedrock of our society. When BMW 
sells leather jackets and briefcases, or Coca-Cola sells t-shirts and Christmas ornaments, 
consumers are not purchasing solely for the product, but also for the "experience" asso­
ciated with the brand. See Drescher, supra note 1, at 332-38 (defining this phenomenon 
as the "branded experience"). 
4. See infra notes 155-162 and accompanying text. 
5. See infra note 156. 
6. Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489,60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.c. §§ 1051-1127 (2000». 
7. Bartholomew Diggins, Federal and State Regulation of Trade-Marks, 14 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 200, 201-02, 206 (1949). 
8. See generally Marshall A. Leaffer, The New World of International Trademark 
Law, 2 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 4 (1998) (discussing the effects of market 
globalization on trademark law and noting that e-commerce is "a forum that transcends 
national boundaries and bears no physical location on 'Main Street' "). 
9. As one commentator put it: 

Experience shows that by the time the judicial machinery arrives at a place 

where the pirate was yesterday, ready to deal with him, that elusive person has 
moved forward and is still a little ahead-at a place where the courts will not 
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Courts have been forced to grapple with the issue of when it is 
proper to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over a defendant when 
he infringes upon a trademark in a foreign country.1° The Supreme 
Court addressed the issue once, but has been silent on the issue for 
over fifty years. 11 Since then, the landscape of business, both here 
and abroad, has drastically changed. Because of these changes, the 
courts of appeals have been left to formulate their own tests to de­
termine when the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction is 
proper.12 
This Note argues that in light of an ever-changing economic 
backdrop, the "substantial effects test" adopted by the Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit provides the necessary and proper 
standard for determining when extraterritorial jurisdiction is war­
ranted. Furthermore, this Note demonstrates that establishing ex­
traterritorial jurisdiction in a global marketplace should be 
dependent solely on the effects of the defendant's conduct, and not 
upon the citizenship of the infringer or other comity considerations. 
Part I of this Note explores the origins of trademark protection and 
the enactment of the Lanham Act. This section details the provi­
sions of the Lanham Act pertaining to extraterritorial jurisdiction, 
as well as the Supreme Court's interpretation of those provisions. 
It also examines three extraterritorial jurisdiction tests which the 
first, second, and ninth circuits have developed. Part II of this Note 
analyzes the circuits' tests in light of the drastic changes in eco­
nomic conditions that have taken place in the last fifty years. Part 
II then uses the Supreme Court's recent expansion of extraterrito­
rial Sherman Act jurisdiction as a basis for expanding extraterrito­
rial Lanham Act jurisdiction. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Origins of Trademark Protection 
Trademarks date back as far as 2000 B.c. and were prevalent 
in early Rome and throughout the Middle Ages.13 Trademarks in 
reach until tomorrow-and is there engaged in doing something which will 
enable him to advantage himself at someone else's expense in some manner 
hitherto unthought of. 
Edward S. Rogers, New Concepts of Unfair Competition Under the Lanham Act, 38 
TRADEMARK REP. 259, 270 (1948), reprinted in 54 TRADEMARK REP. 752, 767 (1964). 
10. See infra Part I.e. 
11. See infra Part I.B.3. 
12. See infra Part I.e. 
13. Although there is no precise date when the first trademark was used, the 
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the form of cattle brands and other crude geometric shapes were 
originally used as a method of identifying the owner of a particular 
piece of chattel. l4 As early economies evolved into trade-based 
economies, trademarks evolved into a means of identifying the pro­
ducer of a particular good.15 
The economy of the American colonial era was nearly entirely 
based upon local and regional trade. 16 Federal regulation of trade­
marks was nonexistent because there was no national market in 
which to sell goods.J7 Therefore, regulation of marks used to iden­
tify goods was a matter handled on the locallevel.1 8 A person wish­
ing to use a specific mark would petition the local court, and the 
practice presumably dates back to antiquity. ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. 
THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE LAW OF COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS AND TRADE­
MARKS 541-43 (2003); Sidney A. Diamond, The Historical Development of Trademarks, 
65 TRADEMARK REP. 265, 268-69, 271 (1975), reprinted in 73 TRADEMARK REP. 222 
(1983). Some of the earliest evidence of the use of trademarks hre drawings originating 
from around 2000 B.C. that have been found on cave walls and depict the branding of 
cattle. Devils Rope Museum, http://www.barbwiremuseum.com/cattlebrandhistory.htm 
(last visited Dec. 30,2006). The Bible also makes reference to branding, signifying that 
the practice was commonplace and well-known to the author of the verse. Genesis 4:15. 
However, until archeologists perform the necessary research and scientific dating, legal 
scholars will continue to differ on a precise date of the first use of trademarks. See 
Diamond, supra, at 265 ("Some day a cultural anthropologist may concentrate on this 
aspect of ancient life and develop a theory to help us understand how and why trade­
marks began."). 
14. See Devils Rope Museum, supra note 13 (providing a history of cattle brand­
ing). The marks found in ancient civilizations served a different function than the 
marks of today. Ancient marks were most likely used to signify ownership within a 
family unit, as these ancient civilizations were centered on family units and had very 
primitive, almost nonexistent, trade-based economies. SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra 
note 13, at 541-43. Such proprietary marks can still be found today. "For example, 
horses and cattle are [still] branded with proprietary marks, and many bottles used for 
the distribution of milk ... have the distributor's mark blown into them." LoUIs ALT­
MAN, CALLMAN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 17.2 
(May 2003) (noting that such marks on products can also be used to trace the goods 
back to the producer in the event of a defective product). 
15. Early Rome was an early civilization that utilized trademarks for economic 
purposes. Diamond, supra note 13, at 270. Perhaps the most famous Roman mark was 
the FORTIS mark found on oil lamps. Id. at 271. The mark has been found in Italy, 
France, Germany, Holland, England, and Spain, leading scholars to believe that the 
widespread distribution was due to copying and counterfeiting which could have been 
the first instance of trademark infringement. [d. at 269. 
16. SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 13, at 543. 
17. See id. 
18. Id. Trademarks did not historically garner much judicial attention. Id. It 
took until 1837 for the first post-American-independence trademark decision to be re­
ported. [d. It took until 1845 for the first state trademark statute to be adopted by New 
York. Id. at 543 n.6. Great Britain adopted its first statute on trademarks in 1862. 
H.R. REP. No. 58-3147, at 3 (1904). 
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court would either grant or deny use of the mark.19 It was not until 
after the Civil War that trademark law became a matter of national 
concern.20 
By the late nineteenth century, large-scale production capabili­
ties allowed producers to nationally distribute products to a grow­
ing consumer economy.21 Along with national distribution came 
the first national advertising campaigns that, in turn, gave birth to 
the first nationally recognized brands.22 Up until 1870, trademark 
law was entirely state created, meaning no federal trademark pro­
tection was available for these national brands.23 A seller was 
forced to comply with multiple state regulations that acted as barri­
ers to his selling products in multiple states.24 As a response to the 
diverse regulations among the states, the first congressional trade­
mark Act was passed in 1870 to unify the protections afforded to 
consumers and businesses under a single, federallaw.25 
1. The 1870 Act 
The 1870 Act relied on the Copyright and Patent Clause for 
power to establish a national means for the registration of trade­
19. Beverly W. Pattishall, Two Hundred Years of American Trademark Law, 68 
TRADEMARK REP. 121, 121-22 (1978). A pre-presidential George Washington peti­
tioned at the local courthouse for a trademark in his G. WASHINGTON flour. [d. at 
121. 
20. SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 13, at 544. 
21. Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property 
Law, /900-2000,88 CAL. L. REV. 2187,2206-07 (2000); see also Swann, supra note 2, at 
586 (recognizing gains in productivity due to the electric motor and railroads). 
22. Merges, supra note 21, at 2207-08 (recognizing trademarks such as QUAKER 
OATS, CAMPBELL SOUP, HEINZ, LIBBY vegetables, PROCTOR & GAMBLE, 
COLGATE, SWIFT meats, PABST, SCHLITZ, and ANHEUSER BREWING). Swift 
forward integrated its slaughterhouse business by using refrigerated railcars to ship fro­
zen meats from the Midwest to the East Coast. Id. at 2207 n.90 (citing PETER GEORGE, 
THE EMERGENCE OF INDUSTRIAL AMERICA 83 (1982». 
23. Merges, supra note 21, at 2208-09; see also Diggins, supra note 7, at 201 (not­
ing that most states have had trademark registration laws). 
24. See Merges, supra note 21, at 2208. The state regulations "would provide 
work for lawyers and state registration specialists but would be detrimental to trade­
mark owners and to the public." Diggins, supra note 7, at 201 (quoting Bulletin Regard­
ing Circulars Recently Issued by Certain Self-Styled "Trade Mark Specialists", reprinted 
in 17 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'y 740, 741 (1935». 
25. See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844,861 n.2 (1982) (White, 
J., concurring) ("[T]he purpose of the Lanham Act was to codify and unify the common 
law of unfair competition and trademark protection.") (citing S. REP. No. 79-1333 
(1946»; Merges, supra note 21, at 2208-10. In 1870, there were only one hundred and 
twenty-one registered trademarks; in 1923, this number had ballooned to fifteen thou­
sand. FRANK 1. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATION OF THE LAW RELATING TO 
TRADE-MARK LAW 134 (photo. reprint 1999) (1925). 
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marks.26 Nine years after the law's inception, the United States Su­
preme Court held the 1870 Act unconstitutional in the Trade-Mark 
Cases.27 The Court held Congress could not regulate trademarks 
through the Copyright and Patent Clause, as trademarks were a 
separate and distinct form of intellectual property not included in 
the language of the Copyright and Patent Clause.28 The 1870 Act 
also usurped the states' control over purely intrastate commerce 
matters and, therefore, the Act amounted to an unconstitutional ex­
ercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause.29 How­
ever, the Court did not foreclose the idea of a constitutional Act for 
the regulation of trademarks based on the Commerce Clause. 
2. The 1881 Act 
With the Supreme Court's decision in the Trade-Mark Cases as 
a backdrop, on March 3,1881, Congress enacted the Act to Author­
ize the Registration of Trade-Marks, and Protect the Same.3D The 
scope of the 1881 Act was very narrow, allowing only the registra­
tion of marks used in trade with foreign nations or Indian tribes.31 
Therefore, this statute offered no domestic federal trademark pro­
tection.32 The limited scope of the 1881 Act ultimately proved inef­
26. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198, §§ 77-84; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 8, cl. 8; Merges, supra note 21, at 2208-09 ("To promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right 
to their respective Writings and Discoveries"). 
27. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879). 
28. Id. at 93-94. 
29. Id. at 97. 
30. Act of March 3, 1881, ch. 138, 21 Stat. 502. After the 1870 Act was declared 
unconstitutional, "Congress was flooded with proposed new legislation on the subject, 
even including a resolution for an amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
granting to Congress express power to regulate the use of trade-marks." H.R. REP. No. 
58-3147, at 2 (1904). 
31. Act of March 3, 1881, ch. 138, 21 Stat. 502; see also H.R. REP. No. 58-3147, at 
2 (noting that Congress based the law on its treaty power as opposed to its commerce 
power). 
32. SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 13, at 545. Thomas Jefferson recognized 
the need for separate state and federal trademark protections early on. Edward S. Rog­
ers, Some Historical Matter Concerning Trade-Marks, 62 TRADEMARK REP. 239, 251-52 
(1972) (originally appeared in 9 MICH. L. REV. 29 (1910». In petitioning the court for a 
sail maker to be permitted to register a mark in 1791, he argued, "[t]hat these cases are 
of divided jurisdiction: Manufactures made and consumed within a State being subject 
to State legislation, while those which are exported to foreign nations, or to another 
State, or into the Indian Territory are alone within the legislation of the General Gov­
ernment." Id. at 252. One can only wonder how our Founding Fathers saw the Com­
merce Clause as a means of federal power over trademark regulations, while it took 
Congress almost 100 years to actually use that clause as a source of legislative power 
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fective at federally regulating trademarks.33 
3. The 1905 Act 
The 1905 Trademark Act built upon the foundation laid in the 
1881 Act by extending protection to include marks used in inter­
state commerce.34 Although the 1905 Act added new sections while 
expanding the scope and applicability of earlier enacted sections,35 
the 1905 Act was still limited in its scope.36 Congress attempted to 
rectify these limitations by amending or supplementing the 1905 
Act a total of sixteen times.37 Ultimately, the Lanham Trade-Mark 
Act of 1946 (Lanham Act) replaced the 1905 Trademark Act.38 
B. The Lanham Trade-Mark Act of 1946 
Before the Lanham Act,39 trademark law "threatened to result 
in 'an intolerable mess, because [there were] 48 separate sovereign­
ties to deal with, each legislating as it [saw] fit with respect to marks 
within its borders regardless of where those marks originate[d]."'40 
State legislatures aggressively promoted compulsory registration 
statutes as "an opportunity to make the outsider pay revenue," 
rather than as a means of providing adequate trademark protec­
over trademarks. See Diggins, supra note 7, at 202-03 (noting that Congress had "a 
feeling of uncertainty as to its powers"). 
33. See Pattishall, supra note 19, at 133-34 (noting that the 1881 Act did not pro­
vide substantive trademark rights, but merely granted access to the federal courts and 
provided prima facie evidence of ownership). 
34. Merges, supra note 21, at 2209; see also H.R. REP. No. 58-3147, at 6-10 (dis­
cussing the provisions of the 1905 Act). Compare Act of March 3, 1881, ch. 138,21 Stat. 
502, with Trade-Mark Act of 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724. 
35. See generally H.R. REP. No. 58-3147, at 6-10 (discussing the provisions of the 
1905 Act). 
36. See Diggins, supra note 7, at 202 (finding the Act to fall short of its 
objectives). 
37. See Pattishall, supra note 19, at 136 (citing Act of June 10, 1938, ch. 332, §§ 1­
3,5,52 Stat. 638, 639; Act of June 20, 1936, ch. 617, 49 Stat. 1539; Act of June 25,1936, 
ch. 804, 49 Stat. 1921; Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 426,48 Stat. 926; Act of April 11, 1930, ch. 
132, § 4, 46 Stat. 155; Act of March 2,1929, ch. 488, § 2(b), 45 Stat. 1476; Act of March 
4, 1925, ch. 535, §§ 1, 3, 43 Stat. 1268; Act of June 7, 1924, ch. 341, 43 Stat. 647; Act of 
March 19, 1920, ch. 104, §§ 1-9,41 Stat. 533; Act of January 8,1913, ch. 7,37 Stat. 649; 
Act of August 24, 1912, ch. 370, § 5,37 Stat. 498; Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 291,36 
Stat. 1167; Act of February 18, 1911, ch. 113,36 Stat. 918; Act of February 18, 1909, ch. 
144,35 Stat. 627,628; Act of March 2,1907, ch. 2573, §§ 1,2,34 Stat. 1251, 1252; Act of 
May 4, 1906, ch. 2081, §§ 1-3, 34 Stat. 168, 169). 
38. Lanham Act, 60 Stat. 427, 444 (1946) (repealing previous Acts). 
39. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.c. §§ 1051-1127 (2000). 
40. Diggins, supra note 7, at 202-03 (quoting Hearing Before Subcomm. on Trade­
Marks of the H. Comm. on Patents on H. R. 9041, 75th Congo 11-13 (1938) (statement of 
Edward S. Rogers)). 
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tion.41 While many trademark infringement suits wound up in fed­
eral court, the absence of a federal common law forced federal 
courts to apply the law of the state in which they sat.42 Trademark 
protection, therefore, varied depending upon the state in which a 
claim was brought. 
Congressman Fritz Lanham, Chairman of the Patent Commit­
tee in the U.S. House of Representatives, recognized the problems 
with state-based registrations and was persistent in his push for a 
trademark revision.43 However, opponents of Congressman Lan­
ham's proposed revisions argued that increasing trademark protec­
tion would hurt competition by granting the holder of the rights to 
the mark a monopoly in the mark itself.44 Consequently, the Act 
would promote monopolistic competition-a chief evil of unfair 
competition laws.45 The Justice Department was among the oppo­
nents of the Act because any expansion of the scope of then-ex­
isting trademark laws could effectively nullify fair competition 
among businesses.46 Congressman Lanham would not heed the 
41. Id. at 202-03, 203 n.27 (quoting Hearing Before Subcomm. on Trade-Marks of 
the H. Comm. on Patents on H. R. 9041, 75th Congo 11-13 (1938) (statement of Edward 
S. Rogers». 
42. Id. at 201-03 & n.27 (noting that the Erie doctrine required federal courts to 
apply the laws of the state where they sat). 
43. See Pattishall, supra note 19, at 136-37 (1978). 
44. Edward S. Rogers, The Lanham Act and the Social Function of Trade-Marks, 
62 TRADEMARK REP. 255, 259-60 (1972); see also Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Mo­
nopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 485 (1999) (concluding that extending trademark protec­
tion "directly threatens competition"). 
45. Rogers, supra note 44, at 259-60; see also Lunney, supra note 44, at 485 (con­
cluding that extending protection today "directly threatens competition"). Although a 
single-firm market by itself would have monopolistic control over price, it has been 
argued that a single-firm market will act as though the market is perfectly competitive if 
there is a threat of instantaneous entry by a second firm. Frank J. Easterbrook, Infor­
mation and Antitrust, 2000 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 1,2 (2000) (citing WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET 
AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1988». 
46. Rogers, supra note 44, at 259-60. It should be noted that the term "monop­
oly" carries with it a severely negative connotation. However, a healthy economy is a 
mixture of "competitive and monopolistic elements." Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising 
and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1171 
(1948) (citing Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, 30 AM. ECON. REV. 
241 (1940». Trademarks are actually anti-monopolistic because they signify the pres­
ence of competing products. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at 50. If the market was 
monopolized by one producer, there would be no reason to promote the trademark 
because there would only be one product to choose from. Id. Trademarks therefore 
give the owner exclusive rights to that mark, not to the market. Id. But see EDWARD 
CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 56-70, 204 (1938) (argu­
ing that trademarks give control of entire markets to a single producer in much the 
same manner as a monopoly). Indeed, scholars have suggested that trademarks are so 
vitally important to economic well-being that they can be used to effectively gauge the 
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critics, and so, over an eight-year period, numerous bills were intro­
duced to five different Congresses.47 Finally, President Harry S. 
Truman signed the Lanham Act into law on July 5, 1947.48 
The Lanham Act radically changed the face of trademark pro­
tection and "did indeed put federal trade-mark law upon a new 
footing. "49 While the intricacies of the Act are outside the scope of 
this Note, a basic understanding of what the Act protects, as well as 
the Act's jurisdictional language and the Supreme Court's interpre­
tation of that language is necessary to understand how the First Cir­
cuit's decision in McBee v. Delica Co. 50 protects trademarks in a 
global economy. 
1. 	 What is a Trademark? 
Put simply, "trademarks ... make possible a choice between 
competing articles by enabling the buyer to distinguish one from 
the other."51 They distinguish similar and competing products by 
economic conditions of a region. See Jay D. Gatrell & S.L. Brian Ceh, Trademark Data 
as Economic Indicator: The United States 1996-2000, 10 GREAT LAKES GEOGRAPHER 
46 (2003), available at http://www.ssc.uwo.ca/geog/research/greaUakes~eographer/ 
GLG_volumel0/Gatrell%20and%20Ceh.pdf. 
47. 	 Pattishall, supra note 19, at 136-37; SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 13, at 
545. 	 The numerous bills that were introduced took the following path to become a law: 
Hearings on the bill and the various forms in which it was re-introduced were 
held in March 1938, March 1939, June 1939, and passed the House and Senate 
in 1939 and 1940. However, the Senate moved to reconsider the bill on June 
23, 1940 and it was returned to the calendar and died. In the 77th Congress a 
re-introduced bill passed the Senate in 1941 and the House in 1942, but the bill 
died upon being referred back to Committee in 1942. Hearings were held in 
the 78th Congress in 1943 and 1944, but the bill was not passed. Finally, the 
1945 version of the bill (H.R. 1654) was passed by the 79th Congress. For 
details of legislative history, see S. Res. No. 1333, 79th Congo 2d Sess. (1946), 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1277-1278. 
Kenneth L. Port, The Congressional Expansion of American Trademark Law: A Civil 
Law System in the Making, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 839 n.51 (2000) (quoting 1 J. 
THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 5:4, 
at 5-11 n.6 (4th ed. 2000». 
48. 	 SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 13, at 545. 
49. S.c. Johnson & Son, Inc. V. Johnson, 175 F.2d 176, 178 (2d Cir. 1949); see also 
Pattishall, supra note 19, at 139-41. One result of the Lanham Act was to eliminate the 
effect of the Erie doctrine in trademark cases in federal courts. Diggins, supra note 7, 
at 213. 
50. McBee V. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107 (1st Cir. 2005). The McBee decision forms 
the basis of this Note and is explained in detail in Part I.C.3. McBee adopts a substan­
tial effects test to determine when extraterritorial jurisdictional exists. Id. at 121. 
51. S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 4 (1946), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1275. In the 
words of Edward S. Rogers, "[y]ou can't have competition unless you can distinguish 
the competing goods and choose between them. Trade-marks make this distinction and 
this choice possible." Edward S. Rogers, The Lanham Act and the Social Function of 
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providing the consumer with a visual stimulus that triggers the con­
sumer's memory.52 The visual stimulus is often the basis by which a 
consumer is able to recall his past experience with the product, 
which in turn prompts him to make a current selection.53 In 1942, 
Justice Frankfurter described a trademark as a merchandising 
short-cut whose goal was "to convey through the mark, in the minds 
of potential customers, the desirability of the commodity upon 
which it appears. Once this is attained, the trade-mark owner has 
something of value."54 Whether the product is an American-made 
COKE or a Japanese-made TOYOTA, the trademark's vital role in 
a country's economy has led to some form of registration procedure 
in over 200 countries.55 
The Lanham Act defines a trademark as "any word, name, 
symbol, or device or any combination thereof used by a person ... 
to identify and distinguish his or her goods from those manufac­
Trade-marks, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 180 (1949). Professor Rogers published 
numerous articles on trademark law and was a primary draftsman of the Lanham Act as 
chair of an ABA committee in 1946. See generally Greg R. Vetter, Introduction, 41 
Hous. L. REV. 707 (2004) (citing a 1949 article written by Professor Rogers for a sym­
posium entitled: "Trade-Marks in Transition"). 
52. See Drescher, supra note 1, at 322-23 (comparing a consumer's perception of 
QUAKER OATS versus oats in a bin). According to Judge Posner: 
A trademark conveys information that allows the consumer to say to himself, 
"I need not investigate the attributes of the brand I am about to purchase 
because the trademark is a shorthand way of telling me that the attributes are 
the same as that of the brand I enjoyed earlier." 
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTEL­
LECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 167 (2003) [hereinafter LANDES & POSNER, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW]. 
53. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law, 
78 TRADEMARK REP. 267,271 (1988) [hereinafter Landes & Posner, The Economics of 
Trademark Law]. Trademarks are, therefore, a tool used to increase the efficiency of 
decision making. SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 13, at 547 (citing William M. 
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & 
ECON. 265, 275 (1987)). However, a consumer will only use trademarks as a decision­
making tool if doing so is cheaper than searching for the desired attributes of the prod­
uct, and past experiences likely indicate future experiences. Landes & Posner, The Ec­
onomics of Trademark Law, supra, at 271 (finding that there must be continuity in 
brand quality). 
54. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 
(1942); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION ch. 3, § 9 (1995) (de­
fining trademark as "a word, name, symbol, device, or other designation, or a combina­
tion of such designations, that is distinctive of a person's goods or services and that is 
used in a manner that identifies those goods or services and distinguishes them from the 
goods or services of others"). 
55. E. Brooke Brinkerhoff, Comment, International Protection of u.s. Trade­
marks: A Survey of Major International Treaties, 2 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & Bus. 109, 110 
(2001) (citing STEVEN HOFFER, WORLD CYBERSPACE LAW § 7.5.3 (1999)). 
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tured or sold by others."56 This easy-to-understand definition de­
scribes what "thing" is being protected by the law. However, the 
"thing's" role in commerce goes beyond such a simplistic definition 
and warrants far-reaching protection. 
2. Jurisdictional Language of the Lanham Act 
Before a court can reach the merits of any infringement claim, 
there must be a basis for the court to assert jurisdiction over the 
matter. Typically, plaintiffs prefer to litigate in the United States 
where trademark laws are more protective than the laws of other 
countries.57 In addition, U.S. courts are more appealing because of 
favorable procedural rules and standards.58 As such, plaintiffs will 
often seek to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction under the Lan­
ham Act, rather than bring a matter in a foreign judicial system. 
The Lanham Act's broad jurisdictional grant rests in its stated 
intent "to regulate commerce within the control of Congress by 
making actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks in 
such commerce."59 The Act defines "commerce" as "all commerce 
which may lawfully be regulated by Congress"60 and holds liable 
"any person who shall ... in commerce" infringe on the mark of 
another.61 Although there is nothing in the Constitution preventing 
Congress from passing laws that reach beyond the U.S. border, 
there exists a presumption that U.S. laws are meant to only have 
territorial application.62 Thus, the question of whether the Lanham 
56. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). 
57. Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Global­
ism, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 505, 506 (1997). As evidence of this, the U.S. government has 
been attempting to force foreign countries to expand or better enforce their existing 
intellectual property laws. Id. 
58. GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES 
COURTS 4 (1996) (noting that U.S. courts permit contingent fee agreements, have broad 
discovery practices, do not usually hold litigants responsible for the adversary's attor­
ney's fees, and tend to award larger damages when compared to other countries). As 
one English court remarked: "As a moth is drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn to 
the United States. If he can only get his case into their courts, he stands to win a 
fortune." Id. at 4 (quoting Smith Kline & French Labs. v. Bloch, 2 All E.R. 72, 74 
(1983)). 
59. 15 U.S.c. § 1127. 
60. Id. 
61. 15 U.S.c. § 1114(1) (2000). Infringement is use of a mark in commerce with­
out the consent of the registrant. Id. 
62. See William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritori­
ality, 16 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 85 (1998). Justice Holmes found it "surprising to hear it 
argued that [acts done outside the United States] were governed by the act of Con­
gress," and found such a notion to be a "startling proposition." Am. Banana Co. v. 
United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355 (1909). Since Congress "is primarily concerned with 
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Act could be applied extraterritorially was a matter of statutory in­
tent that was largely unresolved until the 1952 decision in SteeLe v. 
BuLova Watch Co. 63 
3. SteeLe v. BuLova Watch Co. 
SteeLe was the first, and only, Supreme Court decision inter­
preting the jurisdictional language of the Lanham Act for purposes 
of extraterritorial application.64 In Steele, the defendant was a U.S .. 
citizen operating a watch business in Mexico, where he applied for a 
Mexican trademark for BULOVA.65 The plaintiff watch manufac­
turer had already properly registered the BULOVA mark for use 
on its watches in the United States.66 The defendant imported 
watch components to Mexico from Switzerland and the United 
States, and stamped BULOVA on the assembled watches.67 Al­
though the defendant did not sell his counterfeit BULOVA watches 
in the United States, they were often purchased by American citi­
zens in Mexico and brought back to the United States.68 
The plaintiff filed suit when he was alerted to the defendant's 
infringing acts by upset consumers whose watches had broken.69 
The defendant asserted that the Court lacked subject-matter juris­
diction over the case because the Lanham Act could not extend to 
acts of infringement that occur in Mexico.7° Therefore, the ques­
tion before the Court was whether Congress intended the Lanham 
Act to be applied to the facts in this case.71 
The Court acknowledged this was a case of statutory interpre­
tation, as the laws of the United States do not extend beyond the 
territorial boundaries of the country unless Congress clearly intends 
domestic conditions," any legisl~tion Congress enacts should be confined to the territo­
rial United States. Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949). This view is 
commonly referred to as a "strict presumption" against extraterritoriality. Jonathan 
Turley, "When in Rome": Multinational Misconduct and the Presumption Against Extra­
territoriality, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 598, 607 (1990) (finding that Foley entrenched the pre­
sumption against extraterritoriality as a canon of statutory construction). 
63. See Dodge, supra note 62; Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952). 
64. SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 13, at 831-32. 
65. Steele, 344 U.S. at 281, 285. 
66. Id. at 281. 
67. Id. at 285. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. [d. at 282. 
71. [d. at 285 (finding the issue to be "whether Congress intended to make the 
law applicable" extraterritorially (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 
(1949»). 
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otherwise.12 Since the Lanham Act's plain language reaches "all 
commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress,"73 the 
Court found that the Act shows Congressional intent to confer a 
"broad jurisdictional grant" to the federal courtS.74 The Court 
thereby held the Lanham Act could be applied extraterritorially. 
C. Extraterritorial Application of the Lanham Act after Steele 
In Steele, the Supreme Court acknowledged congressional in­
tent for the extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act when 
both parties to the action are American citizens.75 However, since 
the infringer in Steele was a citizen of the United States, the Court 
did not address whether the Lanham Act could be applied when the 
infringer is not a U.S. citizen and the infringement occurs outside 
the United States. Consequently, the ability of the Lanham Act to 
protect domestic registrants against infringements by foreign in­
fringers is not entirely clear from the text of the Lanham Act or 
from the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Act in Steele.76 
The U.S. Courts of Appeals have subsequently interpreted 
Steele as granting subject-matter jurisdiction contingent upon three 
factors.77 First, the defendant's conduct must have an effect on do­
mestic commerce.78 Second, the defendant must be a citizen of the 
United States.79 Finally, there must be no conflict with the trade­
mark rights conferred by foreign law.80 These factors provide a 
framework for analyzing specific factual circumstances, but "[do] 
not define the outer limits of Congressional power. "81 
The three factors do not amount to a bright-line test for deter­
mining when to apply the Lanham Act extraterritorially. Thus, 
courts have differed on the proper weight and interpretation to give 
each factor when confronted with variations from the facts of 
Steele.82 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir­
72. Id. 
73. [d. at 284 (quoting Lanham Act, 15 v.s.c. § 1114 (2000». 
74. [d. at 286 (quoting Lanham Act, 15 v.s.c. § 1114). 
75. Id. at 284-86; see also 15 V.S.c. § 1114(1). 
76. See 15 V.S.c. § 1127; Steele, 344 V.S. at 283-87 (acknowledging that the Lan­
ham Act reaches "all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress"). 
77. See Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 642 (2d Cir. 1956); 
Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 428 (9th Cir. 1977). 
78. Vanity Fair, 234 F.2d at 642; Wells Fargo, 556 F.2d at 428. 
79. Vanity Fair, 234 F.2d at 642; Wells Fargo, 556 F.2d at 428. 
80. Vanity Fair, 234 F.2d at 642; Wells Fargo, 556 F.2d at 428. 
81. McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107, 118 (1st Cir. 2005). 
82. See id. at 121 (using "the substantial effects test as the sole touchstone to 
determine jurisdiction"); Wells Fargo, 556 F.2d at 428 (finding "each factor is just one 
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cuit was the first court of appeals to interpret Steele, which it did in 
Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton CO.83 In that case, it adopted 
what is now known as the Vanity Fair test.84 The Vanity Fair test 
has formed the basis for other circuits' analyses of extraterritorial 
Lanham Act jurisdiction.85 Interestingly, district courts within the 
Second Circuit have relaxed the Vanity Fair criteria so as to permit 
a wider extraterritorial application.86 
The Ninth Circuit chose to diverge from the Vanity Fair test 
and to analogize trademark law with antitrust law.87 The court 
adopted an interpretation of Steele involving a balancing test of sev­
eral comity factors similar to its prior antitrust jurisprudence.88 The 
Fifth Circuit uses a similar approach, but notes that the Vanity Fair 
factors will be the "primary elements in any balancing analysis."89 
Contrary to the multi-prong tests of the Second and Ninth Cir­
cuits, the First Circuit has adopted a "substantial effects" test as the 
sole jurisdictional factor. 9o In doing so, the First Circuit expressly 
rejected the other circuits' approaches to determining when extra­
territorial jurisdiction is proper.91 To understand why the single­
prong approach adopted by the First Circuit best protects consum­
ers and businesses, it is necessary to first analyze the Second Cir­
cuit's Vanity Fair test and the Ninth Circuit's balancing test. 
1. Second Circuit: The Vanity Fair Test 
Shortly after Steele was decided, the Second Circuit had an op­
consideration to be balanced"); Vanity Fair, 234 F.2d at 643 (finding "the absence of 
one of the above factors might well be determinative and ... the absence of both is 
certainly fatal"). 
83. Vanity Fair, 234 F.2d at 642. 
84. Id. 
85. See, e.g., InCl Cafe, S.A.L. v. Hard Rock Cafe InCl (U.S.A.), Inc., 252 F.3d 
1274,1278 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding that the plaintiff's complaint failed to alleged two of 
the three Steele factors); Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Aeropower Co., 34 F.3d 246, 252 (4th 
Cir. 1994) (remanding for reconsideration in light of all three Steele factors). 
86. See, e.g., Warnaco, Inc. v. VF Corp., 844 F. Supp. 940, 952 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) 
(finding harm to reputation can cause a substantial effect); Calvin Klein Indus. v. BFK 
Hong Kong, Ltd., 714 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (relaxing the substantial effects 
requirement). 
87. See Wells Fargo, 556 F.2d at 428-29 (following its analysis in Timberlane Lum­
ber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976». 
88. See id. 
89. See Am. Rice, Inc. v. Ark. Rice Growers Coop., 701 F.2d 408, 414 (5th Cir. 
1983) (noting that the Vanity Fair factors will be the "primary elements in any balancing 
analysis"). 
90. McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107, 118-21 (1st CiT. 2005). 
91. /d. at 121. 
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portunity to interpret the Supreme Court's decision.92 In Vanity 
Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., the plaintiff sued for trademark 
infringement stemming from the defendant's unauthorized use of 
the VANITY FAIR name.93 The plaintiff was a Pennsylvania cor­
poration that had sold women's undergarments under the name 
VANITY FAIR in the United States since 1914 and in Canada since 
1917.94 The defendant was a Canadian corporation doing business 
throughout Canada, and which, in 1915, was granted Canadian re­
gistration of VANITY FAIR for use in connection with "wearing 
apparel. "95 
In 1919, the plaintiff attempted to register the trademark VAN­
ITY FAIR in Canada for its undergarments, but was rejected be­
cause of the prior registration by the defendant.96 The defendant 
modified its registration in 1933 to specifically include" 'women's 
underwear, corsets, girdles and other foundation garments."'97 In 
1953, the defendant began selling the plaintiff's branded merchan­
dise while simultaneously selling its own Canadian-manufactured 
undergarments under the same VANITY FAIR mark.98 The plain­
tiff's complaint sought an injunction against the defendant's use of 
the VANITY FAIR trademark in association with the sale of under­
garments in the United States and Canada.99 
The Second Circuit developed a three-prong test based on the 
Supreme Court's decision in Steele. lOo For a court to assert extra­
territorial jurisdiction, (1) the conduct of the defendant must have a 
"substantial"l01 effect on U.S. commerce; (2) the defendant must be 
a U.S. citizen; and (3) there can be no conflict with foreign law.102 
Failing to satisfy one of the factors "might well be determinative," 
and "the absence of [two] is certainly fatal. "103 
92. Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956). 
93. /d. at 637. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 638. 
97. Id. (quoting defendant's modification to registration). 
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. at 642-43. 
101. The Second Circuit added the requirement that the effects be "substantial." 
See Anna R. Popov, Note, Watering Down Steele v. Bulova Watch Co. to Reach E­
Commerce Overseas: Analyzing the Lanham Act's Extraterritorial Reach Under Interna­
tional Law, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 705, 710-11 (2004) (noting that the requirement of a 
"substantial" effect on commerce is not present in Steele). 
102. Vanity Fair, 234 F.2d at 642-43. 
103. Id. at 643. 
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After developing its three-prong test, the Second Circuit found 
that extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act was improper in 
this case because only one part of the test was satisfied.104 While 
there were substantial effects on U.S. commerce, the other two 
prongs of the test could not be satisfied.lOS Although the defendant 
employed American citizens in its New York office, the employees 
did not exert enough control over the company to consider it a U.S. 
citizen.106 In addition, there was a valid Canadian trademark creat­
ing an unavoidable conflict between U.S. and foreign law.107 Thus, 
two prongs of the test failed and extraterritorial application of the 
Lanham Act was not proper.10S 
Although the prongs of the Vanity Fair test appear to be une­
quivocal, courts have not applied them in a strict fashion. In the 
years following the establishment of the Vanity Fair test, district 
courts have continually relaxed the components of the three­
pronged test.109 Two specific cases are especially relevant. 
a. Calvin Klein Industries, Inc. v. BFK Hong Kong, Ltd.11o 
In Calvin Klein Industries, Inc. v. BFK Hong Kong, Ltd., the 
district court relaxed the substantial-effects requirement from Van­
ity Fair to include a foreign citizen who resided in New York and 
ran a New York corporation whose actions were causing a diversion 
of the plaintiff's sales overseas.11l The defendant used the CAL­
VIN KLEIN trademark on jeans sold outside the United States.112 
The court found the defendant had "constructive citizenship" due 
to his ties to the United States and therefore found it proper to 
treat him as though he were a U.S. citizen.113 The court also deter­
mined that the substantial-effects requirement was satisfied, as long 
as the infringing activity was "supported by or related to conduct in 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 642. 
106. Id. at 643. In fact, the court found it "abundantly clear" that the American 
employees did not direct the affairs of the company. Id. Such direction was provided 
by Canadian citizens. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. Popov, supra note 101, at 711. 
110. Calvin Klein Indus. v. BFK Hong Kong, Ltd., 714 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 
1989). 
111. Id. at 80. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. As the phrase "constructive citizenship" suggests, the individual defen­
dant was not actually a citizen of the United States. However, the court found his ties 
to the U.S. sufficient to make it equitable to subject him to U.S. jurisdiction. Id. 
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United States commerce."1l4 The diversion of sales from a foreign 
licensee was sufficient to have a substantial effect on commerce.115 
b. Warnaco, Inc. v. VF Corp.116 
In Warnaco, Inc. v. VF Corp., a district court further expanded 
the extraterritorial reach of the Lanham Act by finding that a 
wholly owned Spanish subsidiary of a U.S. corporation could satisfy 
the citizenship requirement, while harm to the plaintiff's reputation 
was sufficient to satisfy the substantial-effects prong of the Vanity 
Fair test.117 In Warnaco, the parties were competitors, and the de­
fendant sold the plaintiff's WARNER merchandise in a disparaging 
manner, which weakened the WARNER trademark in Europe. l1S 
The court found that sales were diverted from the plaintiff by the 
negative impact on the plaintiff's income, reputation, and licen­
sees.119 This led to a direct effect in the United States on the com­
petitive positions of the two firms.12o Warnaco expanded the Vanity 
Fair test by granting jurisdiction even though the harm was not 
caused by a U.S. citizen, but rather, was caused by a Spanish subsid­
iary corporation.121 In addition, the harm to income, reputation, 
and licensees was confined to Europe because the consumers who 
might have been confused were Europeans, not Americans.122 
2. Ninth Circuit: Balancing Test 
In 1977, more than twenty years after the Second Circuit estab­
114. [d. 
115. [d. 
116. Warnaco, Inc. v. VF Corp., 844 F. Supp. 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
117. Id. at 952. 
118. [d. at 944-45. In particular, Wamaco alleged in its complaint: 
[T]hat the Defendants failed to continue their historical practice of introduc­
ing new WARNER's styles into the marketplace, thereby creating a false im­
pression that the WARNER's brand was leaving the marketplace; that they 
failed to print a 1993 catalogue promoting WARNER's brand products and 
instead merely reprinted the 1992 catalogue; that they intentionally ceased to 
manufacture and maintain an inventory of basic carryover styles; that they 
took extraordinary steps to sell off WARNER's inventory and willfully dis­
rupted the marketplace and the orderly transition of the business of selling 
WARNER's Licensed Products. 
Id. at 944. 
119. [d. at 950-52. 
120. [d. at 952. 
121. [d. The court sidesteps the subsidiary issue by finding that the defendant 
will have to litigate in New York because of a forum selection clause in the parties' 
contract. Id. Any burden of New York litigation would therefore be lessened. Id. 
122. Popov, supra note 101, at 713. 
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lished the Vanity Fair test, the Ninth Circuit adopted a "jurisdic­
tional rule of reason" to govern the extraterritorial application of 
the Lanham Act.123 In Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express 
Co., the plaintiff engaged in numerous business endeavors using its 
properly registered trademark WELLS FARGO.l24 The defendant 
was a Liechtenstein corporation which was using the WELLS 
FARGO trademark in the United States and Europe.125 After the 
district court used the Second Circuit's Vanity Fair test as the basis 
for rejecting subject-matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claim, 
the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's decision and adopted a 
balancing test based on the "jurisdictional rule of reason,"126 which 
the Ninth Circuit had established in the antitrust case Timberlane 
Lumber Co. v. Bank ofAmerica.127 The balancing test requires (1) 
an effect on U.S. commence,128 and (2) an analysis of several com­
ity factors.129 The comity analysis the Ninth Circuit adopted from 
its Timberlane decision requires the court to weigh 
the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality 
or allegiance of the parties and the locations or principle places 
of business of corporations, the extent to which enforcement by 
either state can be expected to achieve compliance, the relative 
significance of effects on the United States as compared with 
those elsewhere, the extent to which there is explicit purpose to 
harm or affect American commerce, the foreseeability of such 
effect, and the relative importance to the violations charged of 
conduct within the United States as compared with conduct 
abroad.13o 
The balancing features of the Wells Fargo test are in stark con­
123. Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 427-28 (9th Cir. 
1977). 
124. Id. at 411. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. at 427-28; see Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th 
Cir. 1976). 
127. Timberlane Lumber, 549 F.2d 597. 
128. Wells Fargo, 556 F.2d at 428. The court did not interpret Steele as requiring a 
substantial effect on commerce. Id. The court reasoned that the substantial effects 
requirement is a tool to preserve federalism and state autonomy and is, therefore, the 
way to distinguish intrastate commerce from interstate commerce. Id. (citing 
Timberlane Lumber, 549 F.2d at 612). While the substantial effects requirement limits 
the ability of Congress to regulate intrastate commerce, such a limitation is not needed 
with foreign commerce because the Constitution gives Congress exclusive authority 
over it. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. at 428-29 (citing Timberlane Lumber, 549 F.2d at 614-15). 
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trast to Vanity Fair's bright-line tripartite test. Vanity Fair only re­
quires an analysis of three factors, while Wells Fargo permits the 
court to take into account and afford different weights to a number 
of factual criteria.131 This fundamental difference between the ap­
proaches has allowed courts to give the Wells Fargo test a wider 
range of interpretations, because they are permitted to give varying 
weight to different factors,132 The wide range of interpretations 
gives courts the ability to manipulate facts in order to see justice 
done.133 As a result, district courts have not been forced to modify 
the Wells Fargo test to reach just results. 
3. First Circuit: Substantial Effects Test 
The latest circuit to weigh in on the issue of extraterritorial 
application of the Lanham Act is the First Circuit in its decision in 
McBee v. Delica CO.134 Cecil McBee (McBee) was a well-known 
American jazz musician, whose forty-five year music career in­
cluded world-wide performances of over 200 albums, including six 
albums recorded under his own name.135 He toured Japan several 
times throughout his career and, at the time of litigation, continued 
to do SO.136 Due to his desire to "have [his] name associated only 
with musical excellence," McBee limited the licensing of his name 
to items with a direct connection to his music.137 
In 1984, the defendant, Delica Company (Delica), adopted the 
name CECIL MCBEE for its young women's clothing line in Japan 
and obtained a Japanese trademark for the CECIL MCBEE 
name.138 Delica owned and operated Japanese retail stores, but did 
not sell its clothing line outside of Japan, nor have retail shops 
outside of Japan.139 In 2002, the company sold about $112 million 
worth of CECIL MCBEE products,14o 
Delica used two forms of media to advertise its products. First, 
the company produced a "style book," which contained pictures of 
131. Compare Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 643 (2d Cir. 
1956), with Wells Fargo, 556 F.2d at 428. 
132. See Popov, supra note 101, at 717 (citing numerous Ninth Circuit decisions). 
133. Id. 
134. McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107 (1st Cir. 2005); see also Lewis R. Clayton, 
Extraterritorial Reach, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 26, 2005, at 13 (analyzing the McBee decision). 
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its latest clothing designs, and was embedded almost exclusively 
with Japanese text.141 While the style book allowed a customer to 
order by telephone or fax, a third-party company handled any or­
ders placed in this manner.142 Delica also used a website that was 
created and hosted in Japan, but was viewable from any Internet­
connected device. I43 The website's content was similar to that con­
tained in the printed "style book," but also contained locations and 
telephone numbers of CECIL MCBEE retail stores.144 Consumers 
could not order products directly from the website.145 
After learning of Delica's use of his name in 1995, McBee un­
successfully attempted to have the company's Japanese trademark 
invalidated by the Japanese Patent Office.146 In 2002, McBee filed 
a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of 
Maine, asserting trademark dilution and unfair competition under 
the Lanham Act.147 In dismissing the complaint, the district court 
applied the Vanity Fair test and found that the court lacked subject­
matter jurisdiction over all of the plaintiff's Lanham Act claims.148 
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit re­
jected the district court's application of the Vanity Fair test.149 The 
Court instead found that the "sole touchstone to determine jurisdic­
tion" over foreign defendants is whether the defendant's acts have a 
substantial effect upon U.S. commerce. I50 The proper analysis of 
extraterritorial-application questions is to "first ask whether the de­
fendant is an American citizen, and if he is not, then [to] use the 
substantial effects test as the sole touchstone to determine jurisdic­
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. Id.; see also Cecil McBee Web Magazine, http://www.cecilmcbee.net (last 
visited Dec. 30, 2006). 
144. McBee, 417 F.3d at 112. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. at 113. 
147. Id. at 115. 
148. Id. at 116; see also McBee v. Delica Co., No. 02-198-P-C, 2004 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 23415 (D. Me. Aug. 19, 2004) (applying the Vanity Fair test to determine the 
Lanham Act does not grant subject-matter jurisdiction). The district court found that 
the defendant was obviously not an American citizen and the "relief sought would be in 
conflict with the defendant's trademark rights under Japanese law, as it currently 
stands." Id. at *9-11. Therefore, dismissal was proper without even determining 
whether the effects on commerce were substantial. Id. at *11 ("[F]ailure to satisfy two 
of the three is sufficient to deprive the United States courts of subject-matter 
jurisdiction. "). 
149. McBee, 417 F.3d at 121. 
150. Id. at 118-21. 
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tion."151 The substantial effects test requires compelling evidence 
that is sufficient to "give the United States a reasonably strong in­
terest in the litigation."152 The substantial effects test must also be 
applied in line with the underlying core purposes of the Lanham 
Act, namely to prevent the confusion of U.S. consumers and to pro­
tect the trademark owner's financial interest in the mark.153 Even if 
there is a substantial effect on U.S. commerce that permits jurisdic­
tion, the court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction based on a 
separate comity analysis.154 
II. ANALYSIS-TRADEMARKS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 
Ever-present changes in economic conditions are the driving 
force behind the evolution of trademark law.155 National trade­
mark protection was essential to the merger of the state and re­
gional economies of the early 1900s into a unified, national 
economy.156 While the Lanham Act was the result of a major wave 
of change in the American business landscape, the Act remains true 
to the core purposes of trademark law.157 Specifically, the Lanham 
151. Id. at 121. 
152. Id. at 120. 
153. Id. at 121. 
154. Id. The court here did not refuse to adopt the Wells Fargo framework for 
the comity analysis; rather, the court chose to look at comity after asserting jurisdiction. 
Id. 
155. Swann, supra note 2, at 587 (noting that cultural and economic changes had 
outpaced trademark law at the turn of the twentieth century); Robert W. Sacoff, Trade­
mark Law in the Technology-Driven Global Marketplace, 4 YALE SYMPOSIUM ON L. & 
TECH. 8 (2001) (discussing how European Union member countries have harmonized 
their trademark laws to keep pace with technology-driven global commerce). 
156. Swann, supra note 2, at 586. The state and regional economies could even 
be characterized as local economies, as they were principally agrarian. Because the 
guarantor of purchased products was typically located close to the product itself, the 
need for identification marks was minimal. See id. For example, in many communities 
"the country store owner, not Nabisco (or then 'Uneeda'), stood behind the crackers in 
the barrel." Id. (citing JULIANN SIVULKA, SOAP, SEX, AND CIGARElTES: A CULTURAL 
HISTORY OF AMERICAN ADVERTISING 20 (1998». 
157. Wallace In!'l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 916 F.2d 76, 78 
(2d Cir. 1990) (finding the core purpose of trademark law is to prevent copying of the 
identification features of a product, thereby protecting the investment made by the 
trademark owner); S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 3 (1946). The Senate Committee on Patents 
reported two basic purposes of trademark legislation: 
One is to protect the public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a prod­
uct bearing a particular trade-mark which it favorably knows, it will get the 
product which it asks for and wants to get. Secondly, where the owner of a 
trade-mark has spent energy, time, and money in presenting to the public the 
product, he is protected in his investment from its misappropriation by pirates 
and cheats. 
Id. 
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Act ensures that consumers get the product they want, while a 
trademark owner's financial investment in the trademark is pro­
tected.15s Although the Lanham Act was enacted to unify national 
trademark protection, it would be a mistake to believe the evolu­
tion of trademark law ended with the passage of the Act. The func­
tionality of trademarks will continue to evolve as economic 
practices continue to evolve. The Lanham Act must therefore 
evolve in step with the economy in order to continue to protect the 
core purposes of trademark law. 
The global popularity of the Internet has accelerated the eco­
nomic evolution which began in the late nineteenth century with 
the advent of the electric motor.159 The ability of consumers to in­
stantaneously and inexpensively access a nearly unlimited supply of 
information has created a new wave of change in business.16o Ship­
ping goods east and west no longer means shipping across the Mis­
sissippi River, but is more likely referring to exports destined for 
East Asia or West Africa.16I The rapid growth of international 
trade has forced American courts to confront this second economic 
evolution head-on.162 
158. S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 3. "The law of unfair trade comes down very nearly 
to this-as judges have repeated again and again-that one merchant shall not divert 
customers from another by representing what he sells as emanating from the second." 
Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 973 (2d Cir. 1928). 
159. See Swann, supra note 2, at 586-87 (recognizing gains in productivity due to 
the invention of the electric motor and railroads); Nicholas Khadder, National Basket­
ball Association v. Motorola, Inc., 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 3, 3 (1998) (citing Michael 
W. Carroll, Garbage In: Emerging Media and Regulation of Unsolicited Commercial 
Solicitations, 11 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 233, 234 (1996» ("[T]he Internet has enabled 
users to distribute and sell information very widely at a negligible marginal cost to the 
distributor. "). 
160. Swann, supra note 2, at 591 (finding that the past thirty years has resulted in 
the production of more information than the previous 5,000); Leaffer, supra note 8, at 4 
("Significant changes in the production and marketing of consumer goods have oc­
curred since the 1970s."). 
161. Between 1947 and 2004, U.S. exports rose from $14.4 billion to $807.5 bil­
lion. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, CO­
LONIAL TIMES TO 1970, PART 2, at 884 (1975) (U.S. export data from 1947); U.S. DEP'T 
OF COMMERCE, U.S. TRADE IN GOODs-BALANCE OF PAYMENTS (BOP) BASIS VS. 
CENSUS BASIS 1 (2006), available at http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/ 
historicaUgoods.pdf (U.S. export data from 2004); see also Richard J. Ansson, Jr., Inter­
national Intellectual Property Rights, the United States, and the People's Republic of 
China, 13 TEMP. INT'L. & COMPo L.J. 1, 1-4 (1999) (discussing the position of intellec­
tual property rights in international trade); Kenichi Ohmae, Managing in a Borderless 
World, HARVARD Bus. REV., May-June 1989, at 153 (noting that the boundaries be­
tween countries only exist on political maps). 
162. Swann, supra note 2, at 587 (noting that cultural and economic changes had 
outpaced trademark law at the turn of the twentieth century). Courts are continually 
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The adage "it takes a life-time to build a good reputation but 
only a second to destroy one" applies with equal force to trade­
marks. Justice Holmes recognized this when he stated, "[a trade­
mark] deals with a delicate matter that may be of great value but 
that easily is destroyed, and therefore should be protected with cor­
responding care."163 The delicate nature of trademarks demands a 
level of protection that is available wherever a trademark serves its 
function. 
The Lanham Act attempts to protect a consumer's reliance on 
a trademark while simultaneously protecting a company's financial 
interest in the goodwill a trademark represents.164 These two 
objectives are interdependent-you cannot protect consumers with­
out protecting business and you cannot protect business without 
protecting consumers. When an infringing trademark misleads a 
consumer, two harms actually occur: one to the consumer who pur­
chased a product he did not want, and one to the registrant for the 
loss of goodwill associated with his mark.165 Unlike tests developed 
by other circuits, the McBee substantial effects test confronts extra­
territorial infringement by protecting the core objectives that the 
Lanham Act is designed to promote. 
The McBee test focuses the jurisdictional question on the ef­
fects of the misappropriation of the trademark and not on the loca­
forced to interpret the law in an ever-reaching manner. See generally Jeffrey G. Miller, 
Evolutionary Statutory Interpretation: Mr. Justice Scalia Meets Darwin, 20 PACE L. REV. 
409, 409-15 (2000) (discussing how evolutionary statutory interpretation keeps the 
whole statutory application system vital and healthy). Although some call this type of 
statutory interpretation "judicial activism," others see it as a necessary component in a 
dynamic system of laws. [d. 
163. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689, 692 (1923) (comparing the monopoly 
afforded a patent with that of a trademark). 
164. S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 3 (1946). The Senate Committee on Patents reported 
two basic purposes of trademark legislation: 
One is to protect the public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a prod­
uct bearing a particular trade-mark which it favorably knows, it will get the 
product which it asks for and wants to get. Secondly, where the owner of a 
trade-mark has spent energy, time, and money in presenting to the public the 
product, he is protected in his investment from its misappropriation by pirates 
and cheats. 
Id. 
165. Even if a consumer later finds out his purchase was a counterfeit, the value 
of the registrant's trademark is still diminished. The consumer is now forced to meticu­
lously inspect future purchases bearing that mark or face the risk of purchasing another 
infringing product. This reduces the overall efficiency of the trademark. See Landes & 
Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law, supra note 53, at 275 (finding trademarks to 
be a tool used to increase the efficiency of decision making). 
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tion of the infringement. 166 McBee properly recognizes that in a 
global economy, "absent a certain degree of extraterritorial en­
forcement, [trademark] violators will either take advantage of inter­
national coordination problems or hide in countries without 
efficacious antitrust or trademark laws."167 The McBee test appro­
priately shifts the focus of the analysis from the location of the in­
fringement to whether the conduct has a substantial effect on U.S. 
commerce by disregarding the citizenship and conflict of laws 
prongs that other circuits consider.168 
This analysis will demonstrate that the McBee substantial ef­
fects test is the necessary and proper method for determining extra­
territorial jurisdiction of the Lanham Act in a global economy 
where products and information are not confined to limited territo­
rial regions, but rather are produced, marketed, and sold in a global 
arena. Courts applying the McBee substantial effects test would 
not consider the citizenship of the infringer as a component of their 
analysis.169 Moreover, the McBee test eliminates the comity analy­
sis from the initial inquiry, while still permitting courts to subse­
quently use comity as a basis to decline jurisdictionPO By reducing 
the jurisdictional test to the single factor of substantial effect on 
commerce, McBee ensures that the Lanham Act's objectives of 
preventing consumer confusion and protecting the financial invest­
ment of the trademark owner are fulfilled in light of an ever-chang­
ing global economyPl 
A. 	 Citizenship of an Infringer is Irrelevant in a Global Economy 
Because Products and Information Move Freely Between 
Nations 
A major flaw with the approaches of both the Second Circuit 
166. See McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107, 121 (1st Cir. 2005) (finding that juris­
diction rests solely on a substantial effect being felt in the United States). 
167. 	 Id. at 119. 
168. 	 See id. at 121. 
169. 	 See supra Part 1.C.3. 
170. 	 Id. 
171. The McBee test leaves unchanged the "substantial effects" prong of the Van­
ity Fair test. Compare Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 
1956) (finding that there must be a substantial effect on U.S. commerce), with McBee, 
417 F.3d at 121 (finding that jurisdiction rests solely on a substantial effect being felt in 
the United States). The question of what level of activity amounts to a "substantial 
effect" is outside the scope of this Note. Whatever that level of activity may be, it is 
presumably the same under both approaches. See, e.g., Roger E. Schechter, The Case 
for Limited Extraterritorial Reach of the Lanham Act, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 619, 628-31 
(1997) (offering an example of what might amount to a substantial effect). 
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and the Ninth Circuit is the weight given to the citizenship of the 
infringer.l72 Using the citizenship of the infringer as an element in 
the jurisdictional analysis places an artificial limitation on the asser­
tion of jurisdiction that is based solely on geography. However, the 
Lanham Act contains no such geographical limitation in its jurisdic­
tionallanguage, nor can one be inferred from the Act's stated pur­
pose.173 The Act specifically provides that it is to be applied to "all 
commerce" that may be regulated by Congress.174 McBee properly 
extends the current extraterritorial reach of the Lanham Act, de­
spite the fact that trademark protection has traditionally been lim­
ited to territorial regions.175 
While "[t]he law of trademarks rests upon territoriality," the 
territoriality upon which it rests is not defined by the political 
boundaries upon which nations are divided.176 Trademark rights 
have only been limited territorially to the extent that the goodwill 
generated by the trademark has been limited territoriallyY7 For 
example, before the Lanham Act, a Boston producer of brand X 
only received trademark protection in Massachusetts because the 
products bearing the brand X mark were essentially confined to 
Massachusetts. If the producer were to sell its goods in multiple 
states, it would have to individually apply for trademark protection 
in each state because brand X would be accumulating goodwill in 
those states. Over time, technology enabled the maker of brand X 
to profitably ship its goods to states located great distances from 
Massachusetts.178 When multiple brands began accumulating good­
172. Vanity Fair, 234 F.2d at 642-43 (claiming jurisdiction only if the defendant is 
a U.S. citizen); Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 428-29 (9th 
Cir. 1977) (citing Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 614-15 (9th 
Cir. 1976» (finding the citizenship of the parties to be of great importance). 
173. See supra Part I.B.2. 
174. Id. 
175. Some scholars believe that when transactions become costless, the rule of 
law will not matter because consumers will always have perfect information. See Eas­
terbrook, supra note 45, at 2 (citing Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Costs, 3 J.L. 
& ECON. 1 (1960». 
176. ALTMAN, supra note 14, at § 20:26. 
177. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Trademarks and Territory: Detaching Trademark 
Law from the Nation-State, 41 Hous. L. REV. 885, 895 (2004). A foreign infringer 
would have little interest in copying a trademark if the consumers he was intent on 
defrauding did not recognize the trademark. Without prior recognition of the trade­
mark, the consumers would have no basis from which to recall past experiences with the 
product. See LANDES & POSNER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, supra note 52, at 167 
(finding that consumers use trademarks based only on past experiences with the mark). 
178. Although rail travel was a primary means of product movement, the creation 
of the interstate highway system also forced courts to expand the territorial scope of 
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will nationally, federal trademark protection was needed. The Lan­
ham Act was the result of the need for national trademark 
protection. 
Similar to the expansion of goodwill on a national level, tech­
nology has permitted the inexpensive global accumulation of good­
will on a large scaleP9 In today's world economy, trademark 
protections premised on geographical constraints are ineffective at 
protecting a trademark's goodwill because goodwill is no longer 
confined by geography.180 Anyone with a computer and Internet 
access can view the latest trends from London to New York City 
with a few simple clicks of the mouse.181 In addition, modern ad­
vertising media has eliminated a company's need to have a physical 
presence in a country before information about the company's 
products reaches consumers located in that country.182 In light of 
the Internet and modern media, the McBee substantial effects test 
furthers the core purposes of the Lanham Act by disregarding the 
citizenship of an infringer. 
1. The Internet Knows No Citizenship 
The Internet has had two significant impacts on trademarks. 
First, information can instantaneously be spread without regard to 
geographic boundaries.183 A website thereby allows consumers 
around the world to quickly and inexpensively see a trademark.184 
trademark protection. See Dan L. Burk, Trademark Doctrines for Global Electronic 
Commerce, 49 S.c. L. REV. 695, 715 (1998) (analogizing the interstate highway system 
with the "information superhighway"). 
179. Sacoff, supra note 155, at 8. 
180. Schechter, supra note 171, at 628-30 (explaining that foreign consumers will 
have heard of American products long before the products are sold there); David R. 
Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. 
REV. 1367, 1370-71 (1996) (finding information moves quickly and inexpensively re­
gardless of physical location). 
181. Some commentators even view trademark law to be "a central, if not the 
central, intellectual property issue in electronic commerce." Burk, supra note 178, at 
696. 
182. 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COM. 
PETITION [hereinafter MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS] § 26:18 (West 2002) ("Modern ad­
vertising media lend credence to applying the truism, 'It's a small world."'); Ohmae, 
supra note 161, at 155 (stating that geographic barriers become irrelevant when infor­
mation is easily accessible); see also Swann, supra note 2, at 591 (finding that the past 
thirty years have resulted in the production of more information than the previous 
5,000). 
183. Johnson & Post, supra note 180, at 1370-71 (finding the cost and speed of 
information exchange to be independent of physical location). 
184. Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227,1231 (N.D. Ill. 1996) ("One 
way to establish a presence on the Internet is by placing a web page, which is, ulti­
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For businesses, this is both beneficial and detrimental. The business 
receives the benefit of advertising to a large population at a low 
cost, but must cede control as to where and when the consumer sees 
the trademark.185 Foreign infringers can take advantage of the In­
ternet's lack of geographic borders by selling counterfeit products 
before authentic products actually enter the market. When low­
quality counterfeits end up in consumers' hands, the trademark suf­
fers substantial harm. Consequently, by the time authentic prod­
ucts enter the market, goodwill associated with the trademark may 
be severely tarnished. 
Second, the Internet has transformed the method by which 
consumers purchase their goods. Electronic commerce has turned 
the Internet into what can best be described as a gigantic mail-order 
catalog, with buyers and sellers from all corners of the globe being 
seamlessly connected.186 However, since consumers are unable to 
physically inspect a potential purchase, the trademark is the only 
piece of information upon which a consumer can place his or her 
reliance.187 In this environment, trademarks assure product quality 
for consumers.l88 For the Lanham Act to protect a consumer's reli­
ance in trademarks when purchasing goods in cyberspace, the Act 
must ignore the citizenship of the infringer and focus solely on the 
mately, a computer data file on a host operating a web server within a given domain 
name."). 
185. Recognized trademarks can use target marketing to focus advertising on a 
specific market segment. See, e.g., Ross D. Petty et ai., Regulating Target Marketing and 
Other Race-Based Advertising Practices, 8 MICH. 1. RACE & L. 335, 434 (2003) (finding 
that target marketing encourages campaigns that appeal to a specific group). 
186. Burk, supra note 178, at 702. In 2001, U.S. companies sold over $1 trillion of 
goods by electronic commerce. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, E-STATS 2 (2003), available 
at http://www.census.gov/eos/www/papers/2001l2001estatstext.pdf. 
187. Burk, supra note 178, at 702-03 (calling trademark reputation "critical" to 
online commerce). There are three basic classifications of goods that consumers 
purchase both on- and off-line: inspection goods, experience goods, and credence 
goods. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
OF TORT LAW 284-85 (1987) [hereinafter LANDES & POSNER, TORT LAW]. "Inspection" 
goods are items that a consumer will quickly determine the quality of through inspec­
tion; an example would be fresh fruit. Id. at 284. "Experience" goods are items where 
quality is determined through use rather than touch; an example would be a sealed box 
of cereal. Id. "Credence" goods are items that have hidden attributes of quality that 
may take a while to become known; an example would be an automobile. Id. at 284-85. 
Trademarks tend to be most important for credence goods as these goods typically have 
a higher degree of complexity. Burk, supra note 178, at 702-03. Experience goods are 
bought based on trademarks because of the efficiency of doing so. [d. 
188. See Burk, supra note 178, at 703. Between 1967 and 1992, worldwide trade­
mark registrations grew from 400,000 to 1,200,000. Leaffer, supra note 8, at 5. 
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effects of the infringing act.189 The McBee substantial effects test, 
therefore, properly disregards citizenship as a basis for asserting ex­
traterritorial jurisdiction while the other tests incorrectly rely on cit­
izenship as a factor in determining jurisdiction. 
2. Modern Media 
The Internet is not the only way trademarks find their way into 
the minds of foreign consumers. Corporate marketers pay huge 
fees to have products advertised during sporting events like the 
Olympics and the games of major American professional 
leagues.190 These events are taking on a decidedly international 
feel, mainly due to the influx of international superstars to the 
American sports of baseball, basketball, and hockey,191 
Consumers in foreign countries undoubtedly see their favorite 
players on television and in print. In addition, they see the mastery 
of American advertising at work. 192 Trademarks grace everything 
from the shoes the athletes wear, to the beverages they drink. Be­
cause of this internationalization of media, it is nearly impossible to 
confine trademarks to territorial boundaries,193 Goodwill associ­
ated with a trademark is being built up or destroyed long before the 
product ever reaches the foreign market.194 McBee provides regis­
trants with the ability to bring suit against foreign infringers who 
destroy that goodwill. 
3. Expansion of the Idea of Citizenship 
District courts have attempted to alleviate the harsh effects of 
189. See S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 3 (1946). "The law of unfair trade comes down 
very nearly to this-as judges have repeated again and again-that one merchant shall 
not divert customers from another by representing what he sells as emanating from the 
second." Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 973 (2d Cir. 1928). 
190. See, e.g., Stephen McKelvey & John Grady, An Analysis of the Ongoing 
Global Efforts to Combat Ambush Marketing: Will Corporate Marketers "Take" the 
Gold in Greece?, 14 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 191,191 (2004) (stating corporate mar­
keters pay an average of $40 million to be an Olympic sponsor). 
191. Dustin C. Lane, From Mao to Yao: A New Game Plan for China in the Era of 
Basketball Globalization, 13 PAC. RIM L. & POL'y J. 127, 131-33 (2004) (providing sta­
tistics on the international athletic talent entering American sports). 
192. See Swann, supra note 2, at 605-06 (citing KEVIN LANE KELLER, STRATEGIC 
BRAND MANAGEMENT: BUILDING, MEASURING, AND MANAGING BRAND EQUITY 32 
(1998» (stating that brand proliferation has forced advertisers to turn to nontraditional 
advertising like event sponsorship). 
193. See Schechter, supra note 171, at 628; Leaffer, supra note 8, at 4. 
194. Schechter, supra note 171, at 628-29 (stating that such harm to goodwill re­
sults in lost foreign sales and lost domestic sales). 
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the Vanity Fair citizenship prong by extending the traditional notion 
of citizenship.195 Courts have created the fiction of "constructive 
citizenship" as a means to avoid the mechanical application of the 
test's citizenship prong.196 In addition, courts have also used do­
mestic subsidiaries as an illusory means to satisfy Vanity Fair's citi­
zenship requirement.197 These actions, however, amount to a legal 
fiction that is nothing more than a guise for the erosion of the citi­
zenship prong. McBee better serves the judiciary by eliminating the 
need for courts to mold and shape facts in order to reach a just 
outcome. Under McBee, a court can focus on whether the effects 
were substantial rather than looking to who the infringer is. In 
other words, by removing the citizenship of the infringer from the 
analysis, the McBee test focuses on protecting the goodwill associ­
ated with a trademark wherever that goodwill might go. 
B. 	 McBee Conforms with the General Expansion of the 
Extraterritorial Application of u.s. Law in Light of a 
Global Economy 
The McBee substantial effects test provides the Lanham Act 
with the same level of extraterritorial jurisdiction that is afforded to 
other unfair competition statutes.198 The current trend in the judi­
ciary is to give so-called "market statutes" increasing extraterrito­
rial application, while limiting the extraterritorial effect of so-called 
"nonmarket statutes."199 Market statutes are primarily concerned 
with the protection of market interests and ensuring a level playing 
field.2°O Examples include unfair competition laws and securities 
law.201 Nonmarket statutes, such as environmental protection stat­
195. Indeed, citizenship takes on less importance in this era of frequent fliers 
where individuals are encouraged to move freely around the globe. Chuck Y. Gee, 
Aviation and Tourism: The Traveling Public, 20 TRANSP. L.J. 1,2 (1991) ("Th[e] growth 
of travel and tourism has generally reflected economic, social, and political trends 
favoring travel consumption ...."). 
196. 	 See, e.g., Calvin Klein Indus. v. BFK Hong Kong, Ltd., 714 F. Supp. 78, 80 
(S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
197. See, e.g., Warnaco, Inc. v. VF Corp., 844 F. Supp. 940, 952 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); 
Houbigant, Inc. v. Dev. Specialists, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 2d 208, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
198. See Diggins, supra note 7, at 205 (recognizing that uniformity in unfair com­
petition laws is essential to preserve commerce). 
199. 	 Turley, supra note 62, at 601. 
200. See id. (noting that market statutes like antitrust and securities law consist­
ently get extraterritorial application). Market statutes ensure a level playing field by 
providing fair competition between businesses and consumers. See id. and accompany­
ing note. 
201. 	 Id. 
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utes and employment regulations, protect other rights and inter­
ests.202 The McBee test eliminates comity considerations from the 
jurisdictional analysis in a manner consistent with other market 
statues. 
1. Nonmarket Statutes are Not Applied Extraterritorially 
Trademarks are a form of intellectual property because they 
are often conceived deep in the minds of their creators, in much the 
same manner as writings and inventions. However, trademarks dif­
fer from other forms of intellectual property because of the func­
tion trademarks serve in society.203 Writings and inventions are 
protected by copyrights and patents through statute,z04 and benefit 
society by "promoting the progress of science and the useful 
arts."205 Copyrights and patents-traditional non-market stat­
utes-receive protection which is limited territorially because the 
society those laws are designed to benefit is limited to the territorial 
United States.206 Trademarks, on the other hand, receive statutory 
protection because of the economic function they serve.207 While 
202. Id. 
203. LANDES & POSNER, INTELLEcrUAL PROPERTY LAW, supra note 52, at 166. 
204. The statutory protection for authors and inventors is under authority granted 
by the Patent and Copyright Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
205. PETER A. ALCES & HAROLD F. SEE, THE COMMERCIAL LAW OF INTELLEC· 
TUAL PROPERTY 36, 110-11 (1994) (stating patents are governed by the Patent Act of 
1952 and copyrights are governed by the Copyright Act of 1976); see also U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings 
and Discoveries"). 
206. See Leaffer, supra note 8, at 4 Uustifying poor patent enforcement as a 
means of economic growth); David R. Toraya, Note, Federal Jurisdiction over Foreign 
Copyright Infringment Actions-An Unsolicited Reply to Professor Nimmer, 70 COR· 
NELL L. REV. 1165, 1171-72 n.41 (1985) (noting that patents and copyrights serve a 
compelling public interest by providing the marketplace with "artistic expression and 
technological innovation" while trademarks simply provide a product identifier). See 
generally Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Commc'n Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1097 (9th Cir. 
1994) (noting that the United States is member to two international treaties that afford 
"national treatment" to American copyright holders in member countries). 
207. See Turley, supra note 62, at 601 (labeling the Lanham Act a "market stat­
ute"). Trademarks also allow businesses to command premium prices for trademarked 
products. See James J. Wheaton, Generic Competition and Pharmaceutical Innovation: 
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,35 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 433, 437-39 (1986). This phenomenon is probably most prevalent in the health 
care industry where brand-name drugs are heavily advertised and priced significantly 
higher then their generic, unadvertised counterparts. Jd. (examining the effects of ge­
neric drugs on the pharmaceutical industry); Brown, supra note 46, at 1173 (comparing 
the price of advertised brands of aspirin with wholesale prices). But see LANDES & 
POSNER, INTELLEcrUAL PROPERTY LAW, supra note 52, at 173-74 (arguing that con­
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copyrights and patents enhance our cultural well-being, trademarks 
serve to differentiate competing products and prevent confusion 
among consumers.208 Thus, unlike copyrights and patents, trade­
mark protection should transcend the invisible borders of our coun­
try and protect the interests of the mark holder in relation to an 
economic market, not a political territory.209 
The Supreme Court has consistently been unwilling to give 
nonmarket statutes extraterritorial application.210 This reluctance 
is founded on the idea that the rights and social policies that 
nonmarket statutes further are limited in geographic scope to the 
political borders of the policy makers.211 The Court has held that 
statutes making general references to foreign commerce, which lack 
"any specific language" expressly allowing extraterritorial applica­
tion, cannot be applied to foreign conduct.212 In addition, "limited, 
boilerplate 'commerce' language" is insufficient to evidence con­
gressional intent for extraterritorial application.213 However noble 
it would be to impose U.S. employment law on third world coun­
sumers pay a premium price for the assurance that the brand name product will be 
properly manufactured). 
208. Although trademarks' main benefit is realized though lower search costs, 
trademarks do have the ability to enhance our culture in a way similar to that of an 
author or inventor. LANDES & POSNER, INTELLEcruAL PROPERTY LAW, supra note 52, 
at 168-69. Trademarks, similar to writings and inventions, are often made by creating 
new words or symbols, or creating a unique shape that becomes associated with your 
product. [d. This benefits society by enlarging the overall "stock" of words and de­
signs. Id. Many trademarks also provide consumers with an internal benefit though the 
"intrinsic pleasingness" of saying or hearing the mark. Landes, The Economics of 
Trademark Law, supra note 53, at 273 (1988). 
209. 1 CALLMAN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES 
(West Group) § 4.31 (May 2005) (stating the "relevant market" for unfair competition 
purposes is dictated by where the harm is felt); Burk, supra note 178, at 711-12 (discuss­
ing the determination of the relevant market, which must be based on consumers, not 
geography). 
210. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,252-53 (1991); Mc­
Culloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 19 (1963) (find­
ing the National Labor Relations Act was not intended to apply overseas). 
211. Turley, supra note 62, at 601. 
212. McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 19-20 (finding the National Labor Relations Act was 
not intended to apply overseas). The National Labor Relations Act provides, in part: 
The term 'commerce' means trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or com­
munication among the several States, or between the District of Columbia or 
any Territory of the United States and any State or other Territory, or between 
any foreign country and any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, or 
within the District of Columbia or any Territory, or between points in the 
same State but through any other State or any Territory or the District of 
Columbia or any foreign country. 
29 U.S.c. § 152 (2000) (emphasis added). 
213. EEOC, 499 U.S. at 252-53 (quoting New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. Chisholm, 
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tries, doing so would violate all traditional notions of sovereignty. 
It is for policy makers in those countries to determine the social 
policies of those countries. 
2. 	 Market Statutes like the Lanham Act Receive Far­
Reaching Extraterritorial Application 
Unlike non-market statutes, market statutes are only effective 
if they can regulate the entire relevant market and therefore receive 
extraterritorial application to the extent the relevant market is af­
fected.214 For example, unfair-competition laws have consistently 
been applied to conduct occurring abroad because harms and 
wrongs committed in far-away places that go unchecked can have a 
profound impact on domestic activity.215 Therefore, the Court 
reads the jurisdictional language of market statutes like the Lan­
ham Act broadly in order to provide the protections Congress in­
tended in light of an ever-changing economic market.216 
3. 	 McBee Eliminates Comity Because it is No Longer 
Applicable to Trademark Infringement in a 
Global Market 
In formulating the McBee test, the First Circuit drew strong 
analogies between the policies and objectives underlying antitrust 
268 U.S. 29, 31 (1925». The boilerplate commerce language in dispute in Chisholm was 
from the Federal Employers' Liability Act, which provides that 
[e]very common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between any 
of the several States or Territories, or between any of the States and Territo­
ries, or between the District of Columbia and any of the States or Territories, 
or between the District of Columbia or any of the States or Territories and any 
foreign nation or nations, shall be liable in damages to any person suffering 
injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce. 
45 U.S.c. § 51 (2000) (emphasis added). 
214. Senator Metzenbaum clearly explained the purpose behind extraterritorial 
application of unfair competition laws when he introduced the International Fair Com­
petition Act of 1993. The Senator stated, "[u]nfortunately, we cannot impose our high 
regard for fair competition on the rest of the world. However, [we can] help encourage 
fairness and strong competition in international markets by preventing foreign compa­
nies based in countries that do not foster free and open competition from exploiting 
American consumers and producers." 139 CONGo REC, 936 (1993) (statement of Sen. 
Metzenbaum). 
215. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) 
(applying the Sherman Act extraterritorially). The Second Circuit was sitting as the last 
court of appeals because the United States Supreme Court did not have the required 
quorum. Id. at 421; see also Turley, supra note 62, at 601. 
216. See Miller, supra note 162, at 409-16. "Evolutionary statutory interpretation 
[keeps] the [whole] statutory application system ... vital and healthy." Id. at 415. 
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laws and trademark laws.217 Antitrust and trademark laws are both 
based on unfair-competition principles and are, therefore, both con­
sidered market statutes.218 As market statutes, the same justifica­
tions exist for giving each extraterritorial application.219 While the 
Supreme Court has not examined the extraterritorial reach of the 
Lanham Act for nearly sixty years, it recently revisited the extrater­
ritorial reach of the Sherman Antitrust Act in light of changing eco­
nomic conditions. 
In Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, the Supreme 
Court affirmed and modified long-standing precedent on the extra­
territorial application of the Sherman Act.220 First, the Court reit­
erated the well-established principle that the Sherman Act applies 
to foreign conduct "that was meant to produce and did in fact pro­
duce some substantial effect in the United States."221 Next, the 
Court noted that "Congress expressed no view on the question 
whether a court with Sherman Act jurisdiction should ever decline 
to exercise such jurisdiction on grounds of international comity."222 
The Court, however, remarked that, while not at issue in this case, 
applying comity as a part of the initial jurisdictional question rather 
than as a basis to decline to exercise the jurisdiction that it pos­
sessed would be against prior Sherman Act jurisprudence.223 The 
Supreme Court's elimination of comity from extraterritorial Sher­
217. McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107, 119 (1st Cir. 2005). The Ninth Circuit 
also based its Lanham Act balancing test on its prior Sherman Act jurisdictional test. 
Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 428-29 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(quoting Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 614-15 (9th Cir. 1976». 
218. Turley, supra note 62, at 601. As one commentator noted, "[rlather than 
siblings sharing a room, the two bodies of law are more like parents running a house­
hold. As with parents looking out for the best interest of the children, the guiding 
principle is the best interest of consumers." Willard K. Tom, Deputy Dir., Bureau of 
Competition, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Licensing and Antitrust: Common Goals and Un­
common Problems, Address Before the American Conference Institute, 9th National 
Conference on Licensing Intellectual Property (Oct. 12, 1998) (transcript available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/aciippub.htm) (discussing the similarities between in­
tellectual property and antitrust laws). 
219. McBee, 417 F.3d at 119 (finding antitrust decisions to be a useful guide). 
220. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.c. §§ 1-7 (2000); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. 
California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993). 
221. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 796; see also United States v. Aluminum 
Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945) (establishing the principle that there must 
be "some effect" on imports or exports). 
222. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 798 (citing H.R. REP. No. 97-686, at 
13 (1982» (stating that if a court has subject-matter jurisdiction it could then look to 
comity). 
223. Id. at 797 n.24. The Court did not directly address this question because the 
parties conceded jurisdiction. Id. 
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man Act analysis supports McBee's elimination of comity from ex­
traterritorial Lanham Act analysis. 
As stated in McBee, the problem with using comity as a factor 
in determining jurisdiction is that it causes "the scope of Congres­
sional intent and power ... [to] turn on the existence and meaning 
of foreign law."224 However, as the Supreme Court has noted, 
lower courts lack the necessary information and are generally "ill 
equipped" for balancing sovereign interests.225 Just as lower courts 
. are ill equipped to balance comity factors for Sherman Act pur­
poses, they are also ill equipped to balance comity factors for Lan­
ham Act purposes. 
Indeed, even the Second Circuit has moved away from the 
mechanical application of its Vanity Fair comity prong in order to 
allow for greater extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act.226 
The court found that Congress intended the Lanham Act "to be 
used as a shield against foreign uses that have significant trade­
mark-impairing effects upon American commerce."227 A comity 
analysis will, in most instances, deny protection to trademark hold­
ers against misappropriation of their marks in foreign countries.228 
The McBee substantial effects test properly eliminates any type 
of comity balancing from the jurisdictional analysis. In an era when 
the world is moving towards "more open, procompetitive trade,"229 
vehicles for fair competition like trademarks must be given far­
reaching application.230 The range of protections afforded in differ­
ent countries represents a wide spectrum of political and economic 
224. McBee, 417 F.3d at 121. 
225. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of 
Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 552 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
See generally Michael G. McKinnon, Federal Judicial and Legislative Jurisdiction Over 
Entities Abroad: The Long-Arm of U.S. Antitrust Law and Viable Solutions Beyond the 
Timberlane/Restatement Comity Approach, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 1219 (1994) (analyzing 
the adoption of Justice Blackmun's opinion in Hartford Fire Ins. Co.). 
226. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Bayer AG, 14 F.3d 733, 746 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding that 
if the Vanity Fair test was mechanically applied to the facts before the court, the Lan­
ham Act could not be applied and American consumers would be harmed). 
227. /d. 
228. Id. 
229. Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Challenges for Developing Countries: 
An Economic Perspective, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 457, 457 (2001). 
230. Id. (stating that developing nations must modify their intellectual property 
laws to keep up with the move toward procompetitive trade); see also Keith E. Maskus, 
Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Development, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 
471,478 (2000) [hereinafter Maskus, Economic Development] (finding that developing 
countries provide insufficient resources to enforcement). 
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influences.231 In addition, foreign nations may be "unwilling[] to 
pay the high costs of administering an effective [ statutory] system 
and [ unable] to manage the complex legal and technical issues such 
a system entails. "232 
4. 	 McBee Protects Foreign Interests by Only Asserting 
Jurisdiction When There Is a Substantial Effect 
on U.S. Commerce 
Critics of far-reaching U.S. trademark laws argue that the 
United States is not "the global court of commerce" and the extra­
territorial application of the Lanham Act must respect foreign in­
terests.233 However, McBee recognizes that Congress has little 
interest in protecting foreign or American consumers from trade­
mark infringement where there are not substantial effects felt in the 
United States.234 It is only when a substantial effect is felt in the 
United States that a court may assert jurisdiction. Until foreign na­
tions provide necessary protections through regulation and enforce­
ment, far-reaching extraterritorial enforcement is necessary to 
prevent violators from "hid[ing] in countries without efficacious ... 
trademark laws, thereby avoiding legal authority."235 When a sub­
stantial effect is felt in the Unites States, and "there is in fact a true 
conflict between domestic and foreign law," courts may use comity 
considerations as a means to decline to exercise jurisdiction.236 
CONCLUSION 
When the Lanham Act was passed, "trade [was] no longer lo­
cal, but [was] national."237 Today, trade is no longer national, but is 
international. The evolution of the law must continue to reflect the 
231. Maskus, Economic Development, supra note 230, at 478. 
232. Id. (finding that developing countries provide insufficient resources for en­
forcement and that the "[l]east-developed countries ... have little intellectual property 
to protect"). 
233. 4 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 182, at § 29:58. 
234. McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107, 120 (1st Cir. 2005). 
235. Id. at 119. 
236. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798 (1993) (quoting So­
ciete Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 
U.S. 522, 555 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part». A true 
conflict only exists where a person subject to regulation by two countries cannot comply 
with the laws of both. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 415, 
cmt. e (1987); see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 u.s. at 799 (finding no conflict exists 
where a person can comply with both sets of laws). 
237. S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 5 (1946). 
2006] EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE LANHAM ACT 229 
evolution of the economy.238 The fundamental purposes behind 
protecting fair competition are thwarted if infringements that occur 
abroad and create a substantial effect in the United States but is not 
remedied. The Vanity Fair test was sufficient when international 
trade was still in its infancy and not commonplace. However, inter­
national commerce has matured into an everyday reality, causing 
the Vanity Fair test to outlive its usefulness. The McBee substantial 
effects test represents a better form of trademark protection for an 
international economy. With global, international trade must come 
the ability of U.S. courts to regulate on a global, international level. 
McBee permits such regulation, while simultaneously limiting the 
reach of the Lanham Act to those instances where the United 
States has a substantial interest. 
Finally, the McBee substantial effects test mirrors the Supreme 
Court's analysis for extraterritorial application of the Sherman An­
titrust Act. Just like the Sherman Act, the Lanham Act requires 
use of a substantial effects test to determine subject-matter jurisdic­
tion in order to promote the goals of the Act. By eliminating the 
citizenship and conflict with foreign law prongs, McBee eliminates 
the need for courts to resolve matters of unfamiliar foreign law. 
When foreign trademark infringement causes a substantial effect in 
the United States, the Lanham Act's protections should be trig­
gered and a remedy should be available, regardless of the citizen­
ship of the infringer or comity considerations. 
Brendan 1. Witherell 
238. See supra note 9. 
